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THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL STANDARDS
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE HEARINGS
John C. Gray, Jr.*
Jane Greengold Stevens**

Unemployment insurance claimants are entitled to have state
unemployment programs administeredin accordancewith federal
standards, which include the provision of prompt and fair hearings for claimants if their applications for benefits are denied.
Violations of these rights are widespread, but the United States
Departmentof Labor's Unemployment InsuranceService has never
brought a formal proceeding to enforce the federal standards of
administration. This Article explains why enforcement of the
federal standardsis needed and why it has not been provided, and
suggests methods by which advocates for claimants can seek to enforce federal standards in the face of this failure by the federal
agency.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Social Security Act, an unemployment insurance
claimant initially denied benefits by a state agency is entitled
to a prompt and fair hearing before an impartial tribunal to
determine whether the initial denial was correct.1 Under
federal regulations, hearings are prompt if the state issues
decisions in sixty percent of them within thirty days, and in
eighty percent of them within forty-five days, of the request

*
Project Director, Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B. A.B. 1964, Harvard
College; LL.B. 1967, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1968, New York University School
of Law.
**
Deputy Project Director, Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B. A.B. 1966,
Harvard-Radcliffe College; J.D. 1969, New York University School of Law.
1.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994) (requiring a "fair hearing, before an impartial
tribunal'); California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 129-33
(1971) (interpreting the "full payment ... when due" requirement of § 503(a)(1) to
require prompt hearings).
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for a hearing.2 The Social Security Act directs the United
States Department of Labor (USDOL) to terminate funding to
a state unemployment insurance system if the USDOL finds
that the state has failed substantially to meet federal standards, including those requiring a prompt and fair hearing.3
Despite the long-term poor performance of some states in
meeting these standards, the USDOL's Unemployment Insurance Service (UIS) has never commenced a proceeding to
terminate funds to any state for these failures.4
The goal of this Article is to help advocates for claimants
understand and remedy state agencies' noncompliance with,
and the USDOL's nonenforcement of, federal rules concerning
the administration of unemployment insurance hearings.5 This
is not an easy time to obtain enforcement of federal rules in
any federal-state social welfare program. Many members of
Congress are working to cut funding for these programs or at
least to eliminate federal rules governing the states' use of
federal funds. But an effective unemployment insurance program is a critical part of a fraying safety net. Moreover,
because the unemployment insurance program is funded by
taxes based on wages paid to potential beneficiaries 6 and is
not means-tested, it may be less vulnerable to attack than
other social welfare programs. Indeed, advocates for claimants
have both unique opportunities and special responsibilities in
seeking to enforce federal unemployment insurance rules.
Part I of this Article will discuss the need for federal enforcement of existing standards to protect claimants. Part II
will review the reasons behind the current enforcement failure. Finally, Part III will outline approaches that advocates
for claimants can use to achieve increased enforcement.

2.
20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b) (1995). This provision applies to initial hearings before
administrative lawjudges. See id. §§ 650.3(a), 650.4(a). These hearings are sometimes
called "first"- or "lower"-level appeals. See id. § 650.4(a). Many states, including New
York, provide for an administrative appeal. E.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 621 (McKinney
1988). Different, more flexible timelines apply to these second-level appeals. See id.;
20 C.F.R. § 650. 1(d) (1995) (providing that "the criteria for review of State compliance
in § 650.3(b) apply only to first level ... appeals").

3.

42 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1994).

4.
Gerard Hildebrand, FederalLaw Requirements for the Federal-StateUnemployment CompensationSystem: InterpretationandApplication, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
527, 540 (1996).
5.
This Article deals with federal enforcement of rules concerning unemploy-

ment insurance hearings only. It may apply by analogy to aspects of the many other
federal-state social welfare programs with similar enforcement schemes, such as Aid
for Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid.
6.
E.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 570 (McKinney 1988).
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I. THE NEED FOR ENFORCEMENT
Without effectively enforced national rules, states may be
tempted to provide less than fair treatment to unemployed
people. In our federal system, states compete with each other
to attract businesses by creating a favorable business climate.
An unemployment insurance system offering low taxes to
employers and little protection for claimants may be considered
part of a favorable business climate. Therefore, states may
compete with each other to offer the unemployment insurance
system that is most desirable from a business perspective.
Unfortunately, the best system from a business perspective
may be the worst unemployment insurance system from a
claimant's perspective. The danger of this so-called "race to the
bottom" among states has been recognized as a potential problem since the advent of the federal unemployment insurance
system,7 and it remains a serious problem today. Recent
changes in state laws have contributed to lower rates of receipt
of unemployment insurance among the unemployed.'
Uniform federal standards limit the ways in which states are
allowed to compete with each other in the administration of
unemployment insurance. The federal rules requiring fair,
timely hearings provides one example.9 Likewise, effective federal standards are necessary to ensure an acceptable threshold
quality of state unemployment compensation administration.
Competent state administration is not automatic. Some senior
administrators of state unemployment compensation programs
may lack the experience, attitudes, and commitment necessary
to perform their jobs successfully. Some senior administrators
are political appointees'0 who may lack administrative experience or ability; thus heavy administrative responsibilities may

7.
See, e.g., Frank T. De Vyver, FederalStandardsin Unemployment Insurance,
8 VAND. L. REV. 411,412 (1955) (noting the Committee on Economic Security's conclusion that states feared that implementing unemployment insurance laws would
disadvantage them relative to other states).
8.
See Marc Baldwin & Richard W. McHugh, It's Time to Implement Federal
Standards,WORKFORCE, Spring 1992, at 45, 47-48.
9.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 534 (McKinney 1988) (providing that the Appeal
Board, which controls the hearing process, shall consist of five members appointed
by the Governor, "not more than three of whom shall be adherents of the same
political party").
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fall on the permanent staff, many of whom are civil servants."
Additionally, civil service laws 2 and powerful unions 3 can
make it difficult to terminate these employees, even in light of
poor performance.

II. REASONS FOR FEDERAL FAILURE TO ENFORCE

The federal standards governing unemployment insurance
hearings are particularly vulnerable to nonenforcement for
several reasons. First, the federal unemployment insurance
program, like other social welfare programs, primarily benefits
people with limited organized political influence. 4 Union
support for the unemployed is offset by the greater influence
of employers, who may have an economic interest in weak
enforcement of federal rules benefitting claimants. Second, it
is difficult to enforce federal rules against state agencies because states often have built-in political protection at the
federal level. As enforcement typically involves at least a
threat of withdrawing federal funds to a state,'5 the state's
representatives and senators, not to mention its governor, may
be motivated to exert their political influence against such
threats. The current conservative efforts to eliminate joint
federal-state programs imposing federal rules and to substitute
block grants leaving discretion to the states is the extreme
form of this political reality.' 6
Finally, enforcing timeliness and due process rights involves
challenging the routine practices of state agencies rather than
the states' written rules. 7 It is inherently more difficult to

11. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 535 (McKinney 1988).
12. See, e.g., William E. Garnett, Incompetence in Civil Services Cases, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Apr. 1989, at 30.
13. See Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective
Bargainingin Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1121 (1969).
14. Although local groups, such as the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee and
the New York Unemployed Committee, have spoken out strongly on unemployment
insurance issues on behalf of the unemployed, see, e.g., Nelson Schwartz, An Uncivil
Civics Lesson, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 1992, at 7, the unemployed lack a strong national
lobby.
15. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
16.
See, e.g., Robert Pear, On Social Policy, GovernorsQuietly Split the Difference,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at Al.
17.
Gerard Hildebrand distinguishes between "conformity" issues, which arise
when state law does not agree with federal law, and "compliance" issues, which arise
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force a change in a practice than it is to force an amendment
to a black-letter rule. Practices are complex, hard to prove, and
can change constantly. For example, a state's failure to provide
basic due process in administrative hearings might result from
problems in a wide variety of areas, including the selection of
administrative law judges (ALJs); the training, supervision,
and monitoring of ALJs; the number of hearings that an ALJ
is assigned to conduct daily; or the amount of support services
that the state provides. Excuses for continuing violations can
change at the convenience of the agency. Even highly bureaucratic organizations, like unemployment insurance agencies,
are likely to take on a frustratingly inchoate quality when
pressed to change entrenched practices.
Federal administrative agencies, however, were created to
overcome exactly these kinds of problems.'" Federal agencies
are supposed to have the detailed experience and expertise in
day-to-day operations necessary to identify and solve the complex practical problems of administering a program like unemployment insurance.' 9 In fact, the UIS does have access to the
necessary expertise, as was observed by one of the authors,
who worked with impressive administrators from around the
country assembled by the UIS to advise a New York task force
on its problems with hearings.20
Thus, the limit on the UIS's ability to enforce federal rules
against states is not legal or administrative. Rather, the key
restraint is political. UIS administrators may believe that aggressive action against states would result in reprimand or
retaliation from superiors in the executive branch, from legislators controlling agency budgets, or both. 2 ' Political limits on
enforcement are real yet are often inaccurately perceived by
agency staff as absolute. And unfortunately an agency that
believes that it has no effective power to enforce has no such
power.

when actual state practice conflicts with federal law. Hildebrand, supra note 4, at
531-32. This Article deals with compliance issues.
18.
See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.05 (1958).
19.
Id. § 1.05, at 37 (stating that administrative processes are better suited than
legislative bodies for handling masses of detail and applying scientific and professional
expertise to problems).
See infra text accompanying notes 43-44.
20.
It is hard to think of any other explanation, except possibly laziness, for the
21.
UIS's failure ever to proceed against a poorly performing state. But see Hildebrand,
supra note 4, at 540 n.86 (providing some possible reasons).

514

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 29:1&2

The relatively weak political position of claimants is reflected
in the UIS's failure to include claimants or their representatives in the administrative process. Instead the UIS appears
to deem itself a partner of the state agencies in carrying out
a rather technical administrative task. For example, the UIS
recently established the Performance Enhancement Work
Group (PEWG) to revise the methods by which performance is
measured in the unemployment insurance system.2 2 The UIS
describes the PEWG as "a joint Federal/State work group composed of representatives from Federal National and Regional
Offices, and State Agencies formed in conjunction with the
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies....
The group has developed a set of partnership principles which
recognize mutual responsibility for the UI system."23 Thus, the
PEWG neatly reflects the UIS's focus on the interests of the
state agencies and its willingness to ignore the interests of
unemployed individuals.
This method of operating alongside the states is not new. In
1955, one commentator noted that "there have been very few
cases where sanctions or threat of sanctions have been used to
compel compliance with the ...Bureau's requirements regarding proper state administration. Apparently the states and the
[predecessor to the UIS] have developed working agreements
for consultation on problem areas ....'24 This relationship
continues to exist. As Gerard Hildebrand has said of the UIS,
"When the issue is performance, for example, the USDOL has
never taken a consistently poorly performing state to a conformity/compliance hearing. The result may very well be that
some states do not take the USDOL seriously concerning
performance matters."2 5
Lack of resources or data does not seem to be the immediate
barrier to better enforcement. For instance, the Performance
Measurement Review (PMR), implemented in 1988 by the UIS
to obtain more accurate statistics regarding the performance
of state agencies, represents a major commitment of staff and
resources.26 Designed in three phases, the PMR defined eleven
timeliness measures and five quality measures. The UIS

22. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 13-95,60 Fed. Reg. 3702(1995)
[hereinafter UIPL No. 13-951.
23. Id.
24.
De Vyver, supra note 7, at 421.
25. Hildebrand, supra note 4, at 584.
26.
See UIPL No. 13-95, supra note 22.
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successfully conducted a fifteen-month field test of PMR measures in six states, corrected and validated the data collected
with the help of Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and will
eventually implement the program nationwide.27
Although collecting good data is important, it is meaningless
if the data is not used for enforcement. Although the UIS's
existing system of data collection was sufficient to demonstrate
New York's historical compliance problems,2 8 the political will
to enforce the federal rules was apparently lacking as strong
steps to enforce compliance were never taken. In the absence
of political will, sophisticated data systems and multiple
consultations with states result in a vast, expensive paper
shuffling, not in compliance.
It is sometimes suggested that effective enforcement is virtu29
ally impossible because the remedy, termination of funding,
would injure the unemployed as well as the state and therefore
is unreasonable and politically unacceptable. ° In fact, the UIS,
like other agencies, has many informal remedies short of
termination of funding, including repeated oversight visits,
"jaw-boning," paperwork requirements, and other forms of
intense supervision. 3 These sanctions can force compliance by
subjecting agency officials to an unpleasant work environment
until standards are met.32 Public reports of the performance of
particular state agencies can be an effective sanction. Furthermore, because state agencies often seek funding for special
purposes, the delay or denial of such funding can be used to
influence state behavior. An aggressive supervisory agency can
apply many levels of informal sanctions.

27.

Id.

28.
Compliance now appears on the face of the UIS's form "ETA 5-130," which
is filed each month by New York and other jurisdictions. Section C of the form covers

"time lapse on state UI appeals decisions" at both lower and higher levels, broken
down by time lapse in days as follows: 0-30, 31-45, 45-75, and over 75.
29.
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994).
30.
Cf Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] has been extremely reluctant
to apply the drastic sanction of cutting off federal funds to States that are not
complying with federal law.").
31.
See generally William H. Clune III, A PoliticalModel of Implementation and
Implicationsof the Model for Public Policy, Research, and the ChangingRoles of Law
and Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 47, 60-62 (1983) (discussing the deployment of "legal
incentives" as a requisite part of effectively imposing legal policy on organizations).

32. Not only are these sanctions not applied, but one of the authors also has
observed UIS staff conveying exactly the opposite message to the New York agency
even when New York was seriously out of compliance.
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Although federal enforcement of compliance with performance standards by state agencies is not a simple process, the
UIS has the expertise and resources to do a much more aggressive and successful job of enforcement than it has done to
date. The main barrier to better enforcement appears to be
actual or perceived political opposition.

III. REMEDIES FOR CLAIMANTS
To compensate for the USDOL's failure to enforce the federal
rules governing state administration of unemployment insurance hearings, beneficiaries and their advocates must seek
enforcement of federal standards themselves. For claimants
and their organizations, the task is a broadly political one.3 3
This Article, however, will focus on the areas in which lawyers
may be able to use their expertise to make a special contribution, including litigation and legislative and administrative
advocacy. 4

A. Litigation

1. Suing the State Agency-Unemployment insurance
claimants who have been denied federally protected rights by
a state agency and who have access to counsel can sue the
state agency directly. 5 Individual plaintiffs in class actions can
assert not only their own rights but also the rights of others
similarly situated.3" For example, the authors' office currently
represents claimants in two class actions against the New York
unemployment insurance system: Dunn v. New York State

33.

See Clune, supranote 31, at 53 (proposing a political model to achieve social

change through the law).
34.

See id. at 114-15 (identifying the emerging role of lawyers in public law and

the regulatory system).
35. See, e.g., California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121
(1971) (involving a class action to enjoin enforcement of the California Unemployment
Insurance Code as inconsistent with the Social Security Act). The Department of
Labor took no actions to enforce federal requirements concerning the administration

of the unemployment insurance program until the Supreme Court recognized
claimants' rights in Java. See Hildebrand, supra note 4, at 537-39, 542.
See Java, 402 U.S. at 124; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
36.
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Department of Labor, 7 and Municipal Labor Committee v.
Sitkin. 8 Dunn challenged the failure of New York's unemployment insurance program to provide hearings and decisions
to claimants within the federal timeliness guidelines.3 9 Sitkin
involved allegations that the New York Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board failed to provide claimants with basic due
process and equal protection guarantees.40
A 1979 permanent injunction in Dunn requires the New
York State Department of Labor (NYDOL) to comply with the
federal timeliness regulations for initial administrative hearings before ALJs. 4 ' For many years the state complied only
intermittently with the judgment, and, thus, contempt motions
ensued.4 2 In 1984, a contempt motion led to the creation of an
informal task force, including representatives of the plaintiffs,
the NYDOL, and the UIS. 4' The task force attempted to assist
in developing practices that would produce timely hearing and
appeal decisions. 44 Although some improvements were achieved, after several years the NYDOL's performance deteriorated,4 5 and the agency decided to take steps "on its own" to
address the promptness issue.

37.
474 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
38.
79 Civ. 5831 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1981). This case was consolidated with
Barcia v. Sitkin, 89 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A consent judgment in the consolidated cases was approved by Barcia v. Sitkin, Nos. 79 Civ. 5831 (RLC), 79 Civ. 5899
(RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File), amended by Barcia
v. Sitkin, Nos. 79 Civ. 5831 (RLC), 79 Civ. 5899 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1983)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist File) [hereinafter Consent Judgment].
39.
474 F. Supp. at 271-72.
40.
See Consent Judgment, supra note 38.
41.
Judgment, Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor, No. 73 Civ. 1656 (KTD),
at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1977) (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law
Reform) (ordering the NYDOL's Industrial Commissioner and his attorneys, agents,
employers, successors, and all others acting in concert with him to render 60% of all
first-level unemployment insurance appeals within 30 days and at least 80% within
45 days). Dunn did not involve the promptness of decisions on administrative, or
"second-level," appeals.
42.
See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
No. 73 Civ. 1656 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994).
43.
Id. at *3. In 1984, the United States Secretary of Labor was added as a
defendant against whom no specific relief was sought. See infra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
44.
Memorandum and Order, Dunn, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *3.
45.
Id. at *4; Affidavit of Timothy J. Coughlin, Executive Director, New York
State Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, at 5-6, Dunn v.
New York State Dep't of Labor, No. 73 Civ. 1656 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1993) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) [hereinafter Coughlin
Affidavit] (stating that, as of February 14, 1994, the NYDOL had met promptness
standards in only nine of the past 127 months).
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A new contempt motion was filed in 1993,46 and only then did
the NYDOL achieve some degree of continuing compliance
through such basic techniques as filling vacant AJ positions
and redeploying staff.4 7 Because no plan has been developed to
deal with an inevitable recession, the next downturn in the
economy is likely to bring with it a new round of noncompliance problems.4" A plan is needed because the formula under
which the federal government pays the states' costs of administering their unemployment insurance programs focuses on
the number of cases that the states have handled in the recent
past.49 A state's unemployment insurance caseload can go up

quickly in a recession, but extra funds for increased staffing
are provided only after the fact. Unless special plans are made,
a backlog of cases and delays could build up in New York during the initial stages of a recession.
The complaint in Municipal Labor Committee v. Sitkin was

filed to challenge a long history of unremedied violations of
claimants' due process rights in administrative hearings and
appeals.50 Extensive discovery and negotiations eventually
produced a lengthy consent judgment confirming the duty of
the defendant New York State Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board to provide claimants with basic procedural rights
at the AL level.5 At the administrative appeal level, the
consent judgment established an elaborate check list to be
included in the file of every Appeal Board case to ensure that
claimants' rights were not being violated at the AJ level.52 In
addition, the judgment provided for the extensive training of
AJs.5 Although the steps required by the consent judgment
produced initial improvements, procedural violations have been
identified recently in a growing percentage of the cases reviewed.'
See Memorandum and Order, Dunn, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *3 n.1.
46.
See id. at *4-5 (stating that the NYDOL's "promptness performance" improved
47.
significantly during 1993); Coughlin Affidavit, supra note 45, at 2.
See Memorandum and Order, Dunn, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *4-5
48.
(noting that "economic conditions dramatically affect the NYDOL's caseload").
See 42 US.C. § 502(a) (1994).
49.
See Consent Judgment, supra note 38.
50.
51.
See id.; Barcia v. Sitkin, 865 F. Supp. 1015, 1017-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (referring to the consent judgment and summarizing its provisions).
See 865 F. Supp. at 1017-18.
52.
Id. at 1022.
53.
For example, for the period of January to June 1995 the violation rate was
54.
51.19%. Letter from David Raff, Counsel for Intervenors, to the Honorable Kevin T.
Duffy, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 3 (Aug. 16,
1995) [hereinafter Raff Letter] (on file with the UniversityofMichiganJournalof Law
Reform). Mr. Raff's letter was written on behalf of plaintiffs in the Sitkin case to the
judge in the Dunn case. Id. at 1.
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Although litigation like Dunn and Sitkin creates significant
pressure on agencies to respect claimants' rights, it is, in some
respects, a clumsy tool for this purpose. Many judges have
neither the desire nor the time to oversee recalcitrant administrative agencies on the detailed level necessary to assure continuous compliance.5 5 In a recent decision in the Dunn case, for
example, the court refused to require the defendants to prepare
a long-term detailed remedial plan to achieve compliance even
though the defendant NYDOL's promptness was "very poor"
when plaintiffs filed their motion and the agency was not in
compliance at the time of the decision.56 The court noted that
the issue of unemployment appeals was "very complicated" and
was affected by both "[clomplex social problems" and "economic
conditions."5 7 Because the defendants had recently improved
their performance, the court concluded that it would be "premature" to grant further relief.5 8 The court further noted that the
defendant NYDOL was now giving ALJs more flexibility, using
advanced computer systems, speeding up training, and coordinating the work of satellite offices.59
Courts may be reluctant to commit the time and resources
necessary to resolve the many small disputes that can arise in
the implementation of a complex decree intended to reform administrative practices. For example, since the Sitkin case,
violations of basic due process rules by ALJs have increased
despite the efforts of the plaintiffs' diligent lead counsel and
judicial decisions generally favorable to the plaintiff class."
New administrative problems and failures can arise faster than
the court is able to dispose of the old ones, especially if the defendant agency takes up scarce judicial time by litigating each
disputed issue. Delay through litigation can be an effective

55. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARV.
L. REv. 1281 (1976) (describing the complex ongoing demands on the judiciary involved in administrative reform litigation).
56. See Memorandum and Order, Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor, No.
73 Civ. 1656 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1994).
The court did order the NYDOL to submit a report to the court, to plaintiffs, and to
the Municipal Labor Committee every six months for two years; the report was to
contain lower and higher promptness percentages filed with the USDOL, the number
of unfilled AUJ positions, the percentages of cases not in compliance with Sitkin, and
any written recommendations proposed by plaintiffs and the Committee. Id. at *11.
57. Id. at *4-5.
58. Id. at *7-8.
59. Id. at *6 n.4.
60. Raff Letter, supra note 54, at 3-4.
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tactic for uncooperative defendants unless the usually hardpressed court is willing and able to devote substantial time and
resources to the case.
The federal courts can commit additional judicial resources
to resolving these complex problems. Special masters appointed
under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can
recommend and administer detailed remedies. 6 ' Courts repeatedly hold that, where defendants have been recalcitrant
in complying with remedial orders in institutional reform
litigation, appointment of a special master is appropriate "to
effectuate full compliance."6 2 In extreme cases, temporary
receivers have been appointed to run public institutions unable
to comply with applicable law.63 But obtaining appointment of
even a special master may be difficult. The express language
of Rule 53(b) states that "[a] reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule."64
2. Suing the Federal Agency-If courts are reluctant to
provide ongoing supervision of state agencies, claimants can
sue the UIS to require it to carry out its enforcement function.
Yet, suits against federal agencies for their failure to enforce
even clear federal standards face difficult legal hurdles. First,
American administrative law developed in the context of attempts to limit the allegedly arbitrary power of overreaching
administrative agencies,6 5 not of efforts to remedy their failure
to act. "It was simply assumed that agency zeal in advancing
the 'unalloyed, nonpolitical, long-run economic interest of the
general public' would be assured by the professionalism of the

61.
See Jerome I. Braun, Special Masters in Federal Court, 161 F.R.D. 211 (1995).
62.
E.g., EEOC v. Local 580, Int'l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental
Ironworkers, 925 F.2d 588, 595 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding the district court's appointment of a special master "to consider adjustment of the numbers of minority
apprentices participating in training program and minority journeymen receiving
employment referrals"); Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867,884 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming
a decision in which the district court appointed a special master to oversee the actions
of prison officials and ensure compliance with final injunctive order), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1047 (1989); Braun, supra note 61, at 220 (stating that "the area with the most
scope for creative use of special masters is the remedial stage").
63.
E.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming

receivership where it was the only reasonable alternative to noncompliance with courtordered desegregation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); see also Miller v. Carson,

563 F.2d 741, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding the appointment of an ombudsman
for a county jail).
64.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).

65.

See DAVIS, supra note 18, § 1.06 (discussing the reasons why an attorney

might oppose administrative processes); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (providing a
right to judicial review of federal agency actions).
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administrative branch ....,66 Actions to require an agency to
enforce its rules may be less familiar and congenial to the
courts.
Second, while the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allows
suits to challenge "agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,"67 in Heckler v. Chaney,68 the United States
Supreme Court created a presumption that judicial review under the APA is not available for "[riefusals to take enforcement
steps., 69 The presumption of unreviewability is not absolute.

Congress can subject an agency decision not to enforce to
review under the APA "by setting substantive priorities, or by
otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate
among issues or cases it will pursue." 0 The Court also limited
the presumption by noting that its decision was not applicable
to an agency's belief that it lacked jurisdiction or "an abdication of its statutory responsibilities."71
Although Heckler v. Chaney has been criticized from the beginning, 2 it remains a substantial barrier. Like most statutes
establishing federal-state programs, the sections of the Social
Security Act governing unemployment insurance state the
agency's obligation to enforce in general terms. The Act provides that the Secretary of Labor shall terminate funding
whenever he finds "a failure to comply substantially with any
provision specified in [section 503,] subsection (a),"73 which includes the promptness and fair hearing requirements.7 4 The
generality of this language makes it hard to argue that the
Social Security Act set "substantive priorities" or limited the
agency's "power to discriminate among issues or cases."7 5 In
fact, a central goal in the creation of administrative agencies
was to give the agencies wide discretion in enforcement so that

66.
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682 (1975) (quoting Ben W. Lewis, The 'Consumer" and 'Public"
Interests Under Public Regulation, 46 J. POL. ECON. 97, 105 (1938)).
67.
5 US.C. § 706(1) (1994).
68.
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
69.
Id. at 831.
70.
Id. at 833 n.4.
71.
Id. at 833 n.5.
E.g., id. at 840-55 (Marshall, J., concurring); Note, JudicialReview ofAdmin72.
istrative Rulemaking and Enforcement Discretion: The Effect of a Presumption of
Unreviewability, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1987).
73.
42 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1994).
74.
Id. § 503(a)(1), (3); California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402
U.S. 121, 129-33 (1971) (interpreting § 503(a)(1) to require prompt hearings).
See supra text accompanying note 70.
75.
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they could make effective use of their experience and expertise.7 6 Unfortunately, the general language in the Social
Security Act, originally intended to give.the federal agency a
sword to use in order to actively assist the unemployed,77 has
become, under Chaney, a shield for an agency doing nothing
to protect the rights of the Act's beneficiaries. In practical
terms, Chaney reflects and reinforces any inclination of many
judges to avoid becoming enmeshed in the potential complications of requiring an agency to take action to accomplish a
result. In contrast, ordering an agency not to do something is
easy.
Although it is an arduous task, it is not impossible to sue the
UIS for failure to enforce its hearing requirements, at least
with respect to a particular state agency. 78 An action against
the UIS for failure to enforce hearing rules might fit at least
two exceptions to the presumption of unreviewability that the
Supreme Court recognized in Chaney. First, Congress arguably
set a "substantive priority"7 9 for agency action when it included
in the Social Security Act specific requirements that state
unemployment insurance programs provide for full payment
of benefits "when due" and provide the opportunity for "a fair
hearing" when claims are denied.8 0
Second, the UIS's complete failure to enforce compliance with
hearing rules is an abandonment of its statutory responsibilities. The UIS has never taken a state to a conformity
hearing for poor performance and, in fact, never took any
actions at all to enforce federal statutory requirements concerning the administration of the unemployment insurance
program until the Supreme Court recognized claimants' rights
in CaliforniaDepartment of Human Resource Development v.

76.
DAVIS, supra note 18, § 1.05.
77.
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593 (1937).
78.
Cf Chaney, 470 U.S. at 850 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing examples);
Bargmann v. Helms, 715 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 753, 767-68 (3rd Cir. 1982); Carpet, Linoleum,
and Resilient Tile Layers Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.
1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
79.
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833.
80.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), (3) (1994). The "payment... when due" requirement
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require prompt hearings to claimants
denied benefits. California Dep't of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 129-33
(1971).
81.
Hildebrand, supra note 4, at 584.
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Java.s2 If this is not abdication of the responsibility to enforce
federal standards, it would be hard to suggest what is.
However strong a claim may be made against the UIS,
joining the UIS as a defendant in an action against a state
agency involves a practical litigation risk. If the UIS sides with
the state agency in practice, there is a strong possibility that
the federal court will defer to the UIS's presumed expertise and
deny any relief.8 3 On the other hand, if the UIS, as a defendant, sides with the plaintiffs in pressing the state for compliance, the likelihood of an effective remedy for noncompliance
is increased greatly. To the extent that the UIS's remedial
power is limited to termination of state funding, 4 participation
in a court proceeding makes indirectly available to the UIS the
broader types of formal relief that a court can order with UIS
support, including detailed injunctive relief to resolve particular administrative problems. s5
In practice, the UIS has not used the opportunity for more
flexible remedies presented by pending litigation. In Dunn v.
New York State Department of Labor, for example, the United
States Secretary of Labor was brought into the case as a
defendant.8 6 The plaintiffs sought no relief against the Secretary but joined him as a party "to assure the effective administration of justice." 87 Under this approach, plaintiffs avoided
the difficulties of seeking judicial review of the UIS's failure
to enforce but provided the UIS an opportunity to use the

82.
See id. at 542.
83.
See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970) (stating the general
principle that a court should defer to the views of the relevant administrative agency
when the application of administrative standards are in doubt); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. United States, 217 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1954) ("The [FCC's] interpretation
of a Formula adopted and approved by it after careful consideration-like other
administrative regulations of a responsible governmental agency-is entitled to great
weight if not so unnatural or unreasonable as to ensnare and entrap those governed
by it.").
84.
See 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1994); text accompanying supra notes 29-32.
85.
The consent judgment in Municipal Labor Committee v. Sitkin, No. 79 Civ.
5899 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1983), is an example of innovative injunctive relief that

may be available in litigation, but the UIS was not involved in that case. See supra
text accompanying notes 51-54; see generally Chayes, supra note 55, at 1298-1302
(discussing the decree as a form of relief).
86.
594 F. Supp. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
87.
Memorandum and Order, Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor, No. 73 Civ.
1656 (KTD), at 8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1984) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform); cf United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172
(1977) (recognizing the power of federal courts under the All Writs Act to issue orders
necessary to effectuate orders previously issued in the exercise ofjurisdiction otherwise obtained).
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court to help it enforce its own rules. The UIS did not take the
opportunity. Although the UIS subsequently did participate in
the informal task force created in the wake of the court's 1984
decision in Dunn,8 8 it did so only as a passive provider of
technical assistance and not as a supervisory agency trying to
enforce compliance. 9 The UIS's unwillingness to use the opportunity presented by its joinder in Dunn tends to confirm
that a lack of appropriate remedies is not the main barrier to
effective federal enforcement. Rather, it seems that the barrier
is the UIS's lack of political will to take on an aggressive role
with respect to state agencies.
Another litigation alternative would be to sue the UIS for a
general failure to enforce federal standards without suing a
particular state agency. This has the possible advantage of
obtaining broad, nationwide relief for claimants who do not
have access to lawyers. But this approach runs not only into
the presumption of nonreviewability of administrative inaction
but also into the issue of standing. In order to have standing
to challenge an agency action, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable" to the agency action.9 0 In an action
against the UIS alone for nonenforcement, the UIS would
likely argue that injury to unemployment insurance claimants
caused directly by state agencies' violations of federal law was
not "fairly traceable" to any action of the UIS. Plaintiffs suing
the UIS for a general failure to enforce thus face difficult barriers given the current state of the law.
B. Legislative Advocacy

Some of the weaknesses of litigation as a means of securing
enforcement of federal unemployment insurance regulations
could be eliminated through remedial legislation. The Heckler
v. Chaney majority indicated that the presumption of unreviewability of agency inaction would be overcome "where the
substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to

88.
73 Civ.
89.
force.
90.

See Memorandum and Order, Dunn v. New York State Dep't of Labor, No.
1656 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1512, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994).
Personal observation of one of the authors who was a member of the task
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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follow in exercising its enforcement powers."9 1 The presumption
of unreviewability could be overcome here: clearer enforcement
guidelines for the UIS could be set in a wide variety of ways,
such as a simple statement in the Social Security Act that the
USDOL shall obtain compliance with standards assuring that
claimants receive prompt, fair hearings when state agencies
deny them benefits. Such a statement could be combined with
an authorization to the Secretary to use formal sanctions short
of total termination of funding, such as fines. Another possibility would be to amend the APA itself to overturn the Chaney
presumption of the unreviewability of discretionary agency
inaction. A model for such legislation can be found in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which overruled a Supreme Court decision
that weakened civil rights protections.9 2
Advocates also could work to institutionalize a role for
representatives of claimants within the UIS. At present, the
UIS, while not formally excluding such representatives from
the administrative process, appears to limit them to the peripheral role of commenting on proposals developed jointly with
state agencies. A new statute could require that, when UIS
staff meet with state agencies, representatives of "consumers"
likewise participate. But effective participation by consumers
is not easy to achieve through legislation alone, because
participation requirements can be neutralized in various ways,
including selection of weak consumer participants. Aggressive
administrative advocacy by claimant representatives would be
required to make a participation requirement yield benefits for
claimants.
Another form of legislative advocacy would seek nonstatutory
pressure on the UIS from Congress to enforce federal rules.
The same representatives and senators who may influence the
UIS not to press states for compliance might also force the UIS
to be more aggressive by threatening the agency's appropriation or holding oversight hearings.

91.
470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
92.
See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)) (enacted on the finding of Congress that the Supreme Court
weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections in Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); see also Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100o259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1994)) (stating that the law was enacted to reverse the trend of the Supreme Court
to narrowly interpret several acts protecting civil rights).
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C. Administrative Advocacy

Effective representation of the unemployed with respect to
the UIS depends on the availability of advocates willing to take
on the demanding role of maintaining a continual presence
before the federal agency. This role includes not only commenting on proposed regulations and seeking specific agency actions
but also developing and distributing reports and proposals and
testifying before legislative committees. Some unions have had
the expertise, resources, and commitment needed to take on
this continuing function for claimants, but it is more difficult
for community-based organizations to meet the demand of the
national advocate's role. This needs to change for claimants to
be fully represented at the national level. The participation of
a number of advocates for unemployment insurance claimants
in the Symposium for which this Article was written bodes well
for the future availability of advocates to represent claimants'
interests at the national level.

CONCLUSION

Claimants seeking unemployment insurance benefits have
the right to have state unemployment programs administered
in accordance with federal standards. Among these standards
are requirements that states provide prompt, fair hearings to
claimants initially denied benefits. Widespread violations of
claimants' rights have not been remedied by the UIS, which
has never brought a formal proceeding against a state agency
for failure to comply with federal standards of administration.
Claimants are entitled to seek relief in federal court. While
litigation can be effective, it is limited by case law and practice
reflecting the reluctance of many federal judges to become involved in oversight of potentially complex enforcement activity
of administrative agencies. Advocates for claimants need to explore opportunities for legislative and administrative advocacy
that can combine with litigation to insure that benefits are
delivered to their clients in compliance with federal law.

